People v. Perez by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation




PEoPLE tI. PEREZ 
(12 C.2d '189; 64 CaI.Rptr. 328. 401 P.2d 1M1 
May 1965] 769 
[ Crim. No. 8783. - In Bank. May 21, 1965.] . 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MATIAS 
ROMERO PEREZ et aI., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Witnesses-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Inform-
er's Identity.-There is no privilege to refuse disclosure of an 
informer's identity where disclosure is relevant and helpful 
to the defense of an accused or essential to a fair determina-
tion of a cause. 
[2] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Informer's 
Identity.-When an informer is a material witness on the issue 
of guilt and the accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, 
the People must either disclose his identity or incur a dis-
missal. 
[Sa, 3b] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Disclosure of Inform-
er's Identity.-The refusal to require a prosecution witness to 
disclose, on cross-examination, the identity of an informer 
was prejudicial error where defendants ~laimed an unknown 
person left marijuana in their room and, if the informer were 
that person, he was the only one who might confirm defend-
ants' testimony that they did not know their baggage contained 
marijuana and his testimony might have disclosed entrapment. 
[4] Id. - Privileged Oommunications - Disclosure of Informer's 
Identity.-When defendants sought the identity of an in-
former, the court improperly refused to consider the affidavit 
supporting a search warrant which would have shown that the 
informer observed marijuana in defendants' room; defendants 
showed cause to believe the informer was the stranger alleged 
to have "planted" the marijuana, since one defendant remained 
in the room most of the day in question and the only other 
person known to have been in the room was the stranger. 
[6] OriminalLaw-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers. 
-Inconsistent statements obtained from defendants while in 
police custody cannot properly be admitted in evidence over 
.objection where neither defendant was informed of his right 
to counselor his right to remain silent. 
[1] Accused's right to, and prosecution's . privilege against, dis-
closure of identity of informer, note, 76 A.L.R.2d 262. See also 
Oal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 45. 
McX. Dig. References: [1-4] Witnesses, § 60.5; [5, 9] Criminal 
Law, §448; [6-8] Criminal Law, §107; [10] Criminal Law, §763; 
[11-14] Criminal Law, § 50; [15] Searches and Seizures, § 42. 
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[8] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel.-The rights to 
sel and to remain silent attach when the criminal process 
from investigatory to accusatory. 
[7] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel.-When an accWtea' 
is arrested and the authorities begin a process of interrogation 
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,.th," 
accused is entitled to counsel. 
18] Id. - Rights of Accused - Aid of Oounsel. - To dete~~ , 
whether authorities are carrying out a process of interroga-
tion to elicit incriminating statements (at which time the right 
to counsel accrues), consideration must be given to the length 
of the interrogation, its place and time, the nature of the. " 
questions, the conduct of the police, and all other relevant 
circumstances. 
[9] ,Id. - Evidence - A drnjssions to Prosecuting Officers. - The 
authorities carried out a process of interrogation to elicit ' 
incriminating statement which were thus inadmissible, 
, ,absent advice to or waiver by defendants of their constitu-
tional rights, where it was shown that after defendants were 
arrested and taken to the police station, officers questioned, 
defendants intermittently from midnight to 7 a.m., that the '" 
questions were in accusatory form, and that defendants were 
again questioned the next afternoon. 
[10] Id.-Instructions--Defenses.-The trial court did not errone- ' 
ously refuse to instruct on entrapment where there was no 
evidence that the man defendants alleged "planted" marijuana 
in their room was a law enforcement officer or someone acting 
in cooperation with the authorities. 
[11] Id.-Defenses-Entra.pment.-Though the defense of entrap-
ment is available to one otherwise guilty, it does not follow 
that a defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. 
(Disapproving statements to the contrary in People v. Herrera, 
232 Cal.App.2d 558, 559 [43 Cal.Rptr. 12]; People v. Her-
rera, 232 Cal.App.2d 561, 563 [43 Ca1.Rptr. 14]; People v ••. ', 
Adams, 213 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [29 Cal.Rptr. 57]; PeopZe v. 
Sherman, 211 Ca1.App.2d 419, 426 [27 Cal.Rptr. 353]; People 
v. Benson, 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 532 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908]; PeopZe 
v. Diaz, 206 Cnl.App.2d 651, 671 [24 Cal.Rptr. 367]; People v. ' 
Spencer, 193 Cnl.App.2d 13, 18 [13 Cal.Rptr. 881]; PeopZe 
v. PolsaZski, 181 Ca1.App.2d 795, 801 [5 Cal.Rptr. 762]; PeopZe 
[6] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim-
inal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq). 
[11] Availability of defense of entrapment where accused denies 
participating at all in offense, note, 61 A.L.R.2d 677. See also Cal. 
Jur.2d. Criminal Law, § 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law (1st 
ed §§ 335,336). 
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v. Lollis, 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [2 Cal.Rptr. 420]; People v. 
Jones, 176 Ca1.App.2d 743, 749 [1 Ca1.Rptr. 637]; People 
v. Tillman, 142 Cal.App.2d 404, 407 [298 P.2d 631]; People v. 
Cummings, 141 Cal.App.2d 193, 201 [296 P.2d 610]; People 
v. Evans, 134 Cal.App.2d 733, 737 [286 P.2d 368]; People v. 
Schwartz, 109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455-456 [240 P.2d 1024]; 
People v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 [222 P.2d 58]; 
People v. Gelardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [175 P.2d 855]; 
People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App.2d 690, 694 [121 P.2d 32]; 
People v. Lee, 9 Cal.App.2d 99,109 [48 P.2d 1003].) 
[12] Id. - Defenses - Entrapment. - A defendant may properly 
contend that the evidence shows unlawful police conduct 
amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also shows 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[13] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Wben the evidence shows un-
lawful police conduct amounting to entrapment, the court has 
a duty to root its effects out of the trial on its own initiative, 
if necessary. 
[14] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment is recognized as a 
defense because the court refuses to enable officers of the law 
to consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster 
rather than to prevent and detect crime. 
[15] Searches and Seizures-Remedies for Wrongful Search and 
Seizure-Defenses.-Defendant may challenge the legality of 
a search and seizure without admitting that the property 
seized was taken from bim and without asserting a proprietary 
interest in the premises entered. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Yolo 
County. James C. McDermott, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. Judgments 
of conviction reversed. 
Joseph A. Martin, Public Defender, and John M. Beede, 
Deputy Public Defender, for Defendants and Appellants. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. 
Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Defendants appeal from judgments of 
conviction entered after a jury found them guilty of posses-
sion of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530.) 
At 11 :30 p.m., October 13, 1963, State Narcotics Agent 
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James Shirloh and Woodland Police Officer Glenn Barton en·! 
tered a hotel room in Woodland pursuant to a search warrant 
and conducted a search in the presence of defendants Perez and 
Morales, who occupied the room. Agent Shirloh found a 
canvas bag and a shopping bag in each of which was a package 
of marijuana. He found in an ashtray a marijuana cigarette 
that h.ad been partially smoked. The officers arrested defend- . 
ants, took them to the police station, and interrogated them. 
Morales made a statement inconsistent with two statements 
made by Perez. Perez' statements were inconsistent with each 
other and with his testimony. 
Defendants testified that they came to Woodland on the 
evening of October 12, 1963, to look for work. They met a man 
at a tavern who drove them to a hotel. The man put a package 
in Perez' canvas bag and carried it and his own shopping bag 
into the hotel, where he paid for defendants' room. He put 
the bags on the floor in defendants' room, placed $1.50 on the 
dresser, and left. Neither defendant looked in the bags or 
knew that they contained marijuana.1 Neither of them knew 
the name of the man, and Morales never saw him again .. 
Perez testified that the man returned shortly after 7 :30 the 
next evening, while Morales was out. He brought some tobacco 
cans and cigarette paper, and he rolled and smoked a cigarette 
that did not smell like an ordinary cigarette. He gave Perez 
a package and asked him to bring it to him at 9 :30 p.m. at a 
tavern on the ground floor of the hotel. When Perez did so 
the man gave him $2.00. When Morales returned, Perez told 
him that he was suspicious and that they had better leave the . 
next day. At 11 :30 p.m., however, the officers conducted their 
search and arrested defendants. 
Agent Shirloh had obtained a search warrant on the basis 
of his affidavit that he had received information from a 
Teliable informer known to him who observed marijuana in 
defendants' room on October 13th. Defendants sought to have 
the affidavit admitted into evidence. Upon the prosecution's 
objection, the court ruled that the affidavit was inadmi~sible. 
During the cross-examination of Shirloh, the court also sus-
tRined. on the ground of privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, 
811 hd. 5), the prosecution's objection to questions seeking the 
l)ame of the informer. The court committed prejudicial error 
in sustaining these objections. 
] In response to Agent Shirloh's int.errogat.ion nt the police station, 
however, Perez said that he and Morales "were in on the dEal and had 
IIgreed to keep the marijuana for the man. " 
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[1] "There is no privilege of nondisclosure [of an in-
former '8 identity] if disclosure 'is relevant and helpful to 
the defense of the accused or essential to a fair determination 
of a cause .... '" (People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 807 
[330 P.2d 33], quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.8. 53, 
60-61 [77 8.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639].) [2] Thus, when the 
informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the 
accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the People 
must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal. (Roviaro 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 
639] ; People v. McSkann, 50 Ca1.2d 802, 808 [330 P.2d 33].) 
In Roviaro v. United States, supra, a case that arose under 
the federal narcotics law, disclosure of an informer's identity 
was held to be required because the informer "had helped to 
set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent 
part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment . 
. . . He was the only witness who might have testified to [the 
defendant's] possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the 
package [containing the narcotics] .... " (353 U.S. at p. 64.) 
[Sa] Similarly, in the present case the informer was a 
participant in the crime if it was he who left the marijuana in 
defendants' room. (People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal2d. 748, 751 [3 
Cal.Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673] ; People v. Williams, 51 Ca1.2d 355, 
359-360 [333 P.2d 19]; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d. 
694, 696 [316 P.2d. 1006].) His testimony might have dis-
closed an entrapment (People v. McShann, 50 Ca1.2d 802, 
810 [330 P.2d 33] ; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 435, 
451 [308 P.2d 821]), and he was the only person who might 
have confirmed defendants' testimony that they did not know 
that the bags in their possession contained marijuana. 
[4] It is contended, however, that there is no evidence that 
the man who left the marijuana in defendants' room was also 
the informer. There is no merit in this contention. The court 
improperly refused to consider the affidavit supporting the. 
search warrant, which would have shown that the informer 
observed marijuana in defendants' room on October 13th. 
Perez remained in the room most of that day, and the only 
person other than defendants known to have been in the room 
before the officers entered was the stranger alleged to have 
"planted" the marijuana. Defendants, therefore, showed 
cause to believe that the stranger was the undisclosed in-
former. They seek the identity of the informer for the specific 
purpose of determining if he is the stranger who might be 
crucial to their defense. They need not prove conclusively 
) 
) 
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before disclosure the very fact they seek to obtain through 
disclosure. Such certainty of proof is not required as a fOWlda:-
tion for obtaining the identity of an informer who might be 
helpful to the defense of the accused. (People v. Cas tiel, 153 
Cal.App.2d 653, 659 [315 P.2d 79] ; see People v. Riser, 47 
Cal.2d 566, 587-588 [305 P .2d 1].) [3b] The refusal to , 
require such disclosure was prejudicial error. 
[5] If defendants are retried, the statements obtained 
from them while in police custody cannot properly be ad-
mitted in evidence over objection, since neither defendant was 
informed of his right to counselor of his right to remain 
silent. (Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491 [84 S.Ct. 
1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]; People v. Dorado, ante, pp. 338, 
346-347 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].) [6] Those 
rights attach when the criminal" process shifts from investiga-
tory to accusatory." (Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. at 
492; People v. Dorado, supra, ante, at pp. 348-349.) 
[7] Thus, when the accused has been arrested and the au- ~ 
thorities begin a process of interrogation that lends itself to 
eliciting incriminating statements, the accused is entitled to 
counsel. (People v. Stewart, ante, pp. 571, 577 [43 Cal. 
Rptr. 201,.400 P.2d 97].) 
[8] In determining whether the authorities are carrying 
l)ut such a process of interrogation, we must consider c, the 
length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interro-
gation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police 
and all other relevant circumstances." (People v. Stewa,.t, 
Dln-te, pp. 571, 579 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].) 
[9] In the present case, after Agent Shirloh and Officer 
Barton arrested defendants and took them to the police sta-
tion, they questioned defendants separately and together, 
intermittently from midnight until 7 a.m., with the assistance 
of an interpreter for the Spanish language. Shirloh put ques-
tions to both defendants in the form of accusations. He told 
Perez, for example, that some money marked for identification 
by the authorities had been found in his possession when he 
was arrested, and then asked him to reconsider his answers in 
light of such accusation. Shirloh testified that he repeatedly 
showed Perez photographs of a man because he "wanted to 
have on record . . . statements by him, pointed statements, 
[that] he did not know this man." Both Perez and Morales 
made statements during these predawn sessions. That after-
noon, Shirloh, Barton, and a deputy district attorney took 
turns questioning Perez and elicited another statement. It is 
) 
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thus clear that the authorities were carrying out a process of 
interrogation to elicit incriminating statements and that the 
statements obtained from both defendants are therefore in-
admissible. (People v. Stewart, ante, pp. 571, 579 [43 
Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].) Accordingly, we need not dis-
cuss Perez' contention that the statements made by him were 
involuntary and for that reason inadmissible. 
[10] There is no merit in defendants' contention that the 
trial court erroneously refused to give an instruction on the 
defense of entrapment. There was no evidence that the man 
defendants allege "planted" the marijuana was a law en-
forcement officer or someone acting in cooperation with the 
authorities. (Sherman v. Urvited States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-375 
[78 8. Ct. 819,2 L.Ed.2d 848].) If such evidence is presented 
upon retrial, however, an entrapment instruction would be 
appropriate. We disagree with the Attorney General's con-
tention that to invoke the defense of entrapment a defendant 
must admit committing the criminal acts charged. [11] Al-
though the defense is available to a defendant who is otherwise 
guilty (Peop'te v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [345 P.2d 928]), it 
does not follow that the defendant must admit guilt to estab-
lish the defense. A defendant, for example, may deny that he 
committed every element of the crime charged, yet properly 
allege that such acts as he did commit were induced by law 
enforcement officers. (People v. West, 139 Cal.App.2d Supp. 
923, 926 [293 P.2d 166]; Henderson v. United States (5th 
Cir.) 237 F.2d 169, 173.) [12] Moreover, a defendant may 
properly contend that the evidence shows unlawful police 
conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it 
also shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [13] When 
the evidence does show such conduct, the court has a duty 
to root its effects out of the trial upon its own initiative if 
necessary. (See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453, 
457 [53 8. Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86 A.L.R. 249] [Roberts, J., 
concurring].) [14] Entrapment is recognized as a defense 
because "the court refuses to enable officers of the law to 
consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster rather 
than prevent and detect crime." (People v. Benford, 53 Ca1.2d 
1, 9 [345 P.2d 928] ; see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445-
446 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].) A rule designed to 
deter such unlawful conduct cannot properly be restricted by 
compelling a defendant to incriminate himself as a condition 
to invoking the rule. [15] Thus, the defendant may chal-
lenge the legality of a search and seizure without admitting 
) 
·~ 
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that the property seized was taken from him and without ~=!'1 
serting a proprietary interest in the premises entered. (People ~. 
v. Ibarr(J., 60 Ca1.2d 460, 465 [34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d i 
487] ; People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 759-761 [290 P.2d 855].) . ;>: 
To compel a defendant to admit guilt as a- condition to in-
voking the defense of entrapment would compel him to relieve 
the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt ibeyond a 
reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his 
burden of proving entrapment. To put the defendant in that 
dilemma would frustrate the assertion of the defense itself 
and would thus undermine its policy. (See People v. West, 139 
Cal.App.2d Supp. 923, 926 {293 P.2d 166]; Henderson v. 
United States (5th Cir.) 237 F.2d 169, 172-173; 1 Witkin,. 
Cal. Crimes (1963) p. 169; 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333, 1343 j 70. 
Harv.L.Rev. 1302; 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. 542.) Statements to the 
contrary in the cases cited in the margin are disapproved. Z 
The judgments are reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
I 
McComb, J., and Schauer, J.,. concurred in the judgment. .) 
---------------------- '.". 
JPllople .... Blln"6f'G, 132 Cal.App.2d 558, 559 [43 Oal.Rftr. 12]; 
People .... BtJfT6f'a, 132 Cal.App.2d 561, 563 [43 Cal.Rptr. 14: ; PIIOP'" 
v. Ada1n8, 213 Cal.App.2d 586, 540 [29 Cal.Rptr. 57]; Pllople v. Sherman, 
211 Cal.App.ld 419, 426 [27 Cal.Rptr. 358]; Pllople v. B6MOfI" 206 
Cal.App.2d 519, 582 [28 Cal.Rptr. 908]; Pllople v. ])W, 206 Cal.App.2d 
651, 671 [24 Cal.Rptr. 367]; People v. Bpm.oer, 193 Cal.App.2d 13, 18 
[13 Cal.Rptr. 881]; Peoplll v. Poual87ci, 181 Cal.App.2d 795, 801 [5 
Cal.Rptr. 762]; People v. Lollis, 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 670 [2 Cal.Rptr. 
420]; People v. :Jones, 176 Cal.App.2d 743,749 [1 Cal.Rptr. 637]; People 
v. Tillman, 142 Cal.App.2d 404,407 [298 P.2d 681]; People v. Cumming', 
141 Cal.App.2d 198, 201 [296 P.2d 610] ; PeopZe v. Evana, 184 Cal.App.2d 
783, 787 [286 P.2d 368]; People v. SchwartB, 109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455-
456 [240 P.2d 1024]; Pllople v. :JohnaOfl, 99 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 [222 
P.2d 58]; People v. GIIlardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [175 P.2d 855]; 
People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App. 690, 694 [121 P.2d 32]; Pllople v. Lee, 
9 Cal.App.2d 99, 109 [48 P.2d 1008]. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assien-
• " ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
